Exhibit 99

Risk Factors

Risks Relating to Our Businesses

Interest rate fluctuations could adversely affect our business and profitability.

Our insurance and investment products are sensitive to interest rate fluctuations and expose us to the risk that falling interest rates will reduce our “spread,” or the difference between the returns we earn on the investments that support our obligations under these products and the amounts that we must pay policyholders and contractholders. Because we may reduce the interest rates we credit on most of these products only at limited, pre-established intervals, and because some of them have guaranteed minimum crediting rates, declines in interest rates may adversely affect the profitability of those products. For example, interest rates declined to unusually low levels in 2002 and 2003. During this period, our net earnings from spread-based products, such as fixed and income annuities and guaranteed investment contracts, declined from $166 million for the year ended December 31, 2002 to $138 million for the year ended December 31, 2003. Although interest rates increased in 2004, they remain at low levels and limit our returns on our spread-based investment products.

During periods of increasing market interest rates, we may offer higher crediting rates on interest-sensitive products, such as universal life insurance and fixed annuities, and we may increase crediting rates on in-force products to keep these products competitive. In addition, rapidly rising interest rates may cause increased policy surrenders, withdrawals from life insurance policies and annuity contracts and requests for policy loans, as policyholders and contractholders shift assets into higher yielding investments. Increases in crediting rates, as well as surrenders and withdrawals, could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

Our term life and long-term care insurance products also expose us to the risk of interest rate fluctuations. The pricing and expected future profitability of these products are based in part on expected investment returns. Over time, term life and long-term care insurance products generally produce positive cash flows as customers pay periodic premiums, which we invest as we receive them. Low interest rates may reduce our ability to achieve our targeted investment margins and may adversely affect the profitability of our term life and long-term care insurance products.

In our mortgage insurance business, rising interest rates generally reduce the volume of new mortgage originations, resulting in a decrease in the volume of new insurance written. The level of new mortgage originations in the U.S. decreased to $2,810 billion for the year ended December 31, 2004 from $3,760 billion for the year ended December 31, 2003. This resulted in decreased levels of new mortgage insurance written. We believe the decrease in mortgage originations was due to two principal factors. First, increasing interest rates in 2004 made refinancings of existing mortgages less attractive to consumers than in recent years. Second, historically low interest rates in 2002 and 2003 contributed to substantial refinancing activity, which did not recur in 2004 because many mortgages for which refinancing would otherwise have been economically attractive were already refinanced prior to 2004. Further increases in interest rates could cause the volume of mortgage originations to decline further, which would have an adverse effect on our new mortgage insurance written.

Rising interest rates also can increase the monthly mortgage payments for insured homeowners with adjustable rate mortgages, or ARMs, which could have the effect of increasing default rates on ARM loans and thereby increasing our exposure on our mortgage insurance policies. This is particularly relevant in our non-U.S. mortgage insurance business, where ARMs are the predominant mortgage product. ARMs also have increased as a percentage of the U.S. mortgage loans that we insure.

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Declining interest rates increase the rate at which insured borrowers refinance their existing mortgages, thereby resulting in cancellations of the mortgage insurance covering the refinanced loans. Declining interest rates may also contribute to home price appreciation, which may provide insured borrowers in the U.S. with the option of canceling their mortgage insurance coverage earlier than we anticipated in pricing that coverage. These cancellations could have an adverse effect on our results from our mortgage insurance business.

Interest rate fluctuations also could have an adverse effect on the results of our investment portfolio. During periods of declining market interest rates, the interest we receive on variable interest rate investments decreases. In addition, during those periods, we are forced to reinvest the cash we receive as interest or return of principal on our investments in lower-yielding high-grade instruments or in lower-credit instruments to maintain comparable returns. Issuers of fixed-income securities also may decide to prepay their obligations in order to borrow at lower market rates, which exacerbates the risk that we may have to invest the cash proceeds of these securities in lower-yielding or lower-credit instruments. Declining interest rates from 2002 to 2004 contributed to a decrease in our weighted average investment yield from 6.0% for the year ended December 31, 2002 to 5.8% and 5.5% for the years ended December 31, 2003 and 2004, respectively.

Downturns and volatility in equity markets could adversely affect our business and profitability.

Significant downturns and volatility in equity markets could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations in two principal ways. First, market downturns and volatility may discourage purchases of separate account products, such as variable annuities and variable life insurance, that have returns linked to the performance of the equity markets and may cause some existing customers to withdraw cash values or reduce investments in those products.

Second, downturns and volatility in equity markets can have an adverse effect on the revenues and returns from our separate account and private asset management products and services. Because these products and services depend on fees related primarily to the value of assets under management, a decline in the equity markets could reduce our revenues by reducing the value of the investment assets we manage.

Defaults in our fixed-income securities portfolio may reduce our earnings.

Issuers of the fixed-income securities that we own may default on principal and interest payments. As a result of the economic downturn and recent corporate malfeasance, the number of companies defaulting on their debt obligations has increased dramatically in recent years. As of December 31, 2004 and 2003, we had fixed maturities in or near default (where the issuer has missed payment of principal or interest or entered bankruptcy) with a fair value of $58 million and $190 million, respectively. An economic downturn, further events of corporate malfeasance or a variety of other factors could cause declines in the value of our fixed maturities portfolio and cause our net earnings to decline.

We recognized gross capital gains of $90 million, $473 million and $790 million for the years ended December 31, 2004, 2003 and 2002, respectively. We realized these capital gains in part to offset default-related losses during those periods. However, capital gains may not be available in the future, and if they are, we may elect not to recognize capital gains to offset losses.

A downgrade or a potential downgrade in our financial strength or credit ratings could result in a loss of business and adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations.

Financial strength ratings, which various ratings organizations publish as measures of an insurance company’s ability to meet contractholder and policyholder obligations, are important to maintaining public confidence in our products, the ability to market our products and our competitive position. Our principal life insurance companies currently have financial strength ratings of “AA-” (Very Strong) from S&P and Fitch and “Aa3” (Excellent) from Moody’s. Our mortgage insurance companies currently have financial strength ratings of

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“AA” (Very Strong) from S&P and Fitch and “Aa2” (Excellent) from Moody’s. The “AA” and “AA-” ratings are the third- and fourth-highest of S&P’s 20 ratings categories, respectively. The “Aa2” and “Aa3” ratings are the third- and fourth-highest of Moody’s 21 ratings categories, respectively. The “AA” and “AA-” ratings are the third- and fourth-highest of Fitch’s 24 ratings categories.

A downgrade in our financial strength ratings, or the announced potential for a downgrade, could have a significant adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations in many ways, including:

The charters of the Federal National Mortgage Corporation, or Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or Freddie Mac, only permit them to buy high loan-to-value mortgages that are insured by a “qualified insurer,” as determined by each of them. Their current rules effectively provide that they will accept mortgage insurance only from private mortgage insurers with financial strength ratings of at least “AA-” by S&P and “Aa3” by Moody’s. If our mortgage insurance companies’ financial strength ratings decrease below the thresholds established by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, we would not be able to insure mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Approximately 68% of the flow loans we insured in the U.S. during the year ended December 31, 2004 were sold to either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. An inability to insure mortgage loans sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or their transfer of our existing policies to an alternative mortgage insurer, would have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

In 2003, the U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight announced a risk-based capital rule that treats credit enhancements issued by private mortgage insurers with financial strength ratings of “AAA” more favorably than those issued by “AA” rated insurers. Neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie Mac has adopted policies that distinguish between “AA” rated and “AAA” rated mortgage insurers. However, if Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac adopts policies that treat “AAA” rated insurers more favorably than “AA” rated insurers, our competitive position may suffer.

In addition to the financial strength ratings of our insurance subsidiaries, ratings agencies also publish credit ratings for our company. The credit ratings have an impact on the interest rates we pay on the money we borrow. Therefore, a downgrade in our credit ratings could increase our cost of borrowing and have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

The ratings of our insurance subsidiaries are not evaluations directed to the protection of investors in our securities.

The ratings of our insurance subsidiaries described under “Business—Financial Strength Ratings” reflect each rating agency’s current opinion of each subsidiary’s financial strength, operating performance and ability to meet obligations to policyholders and contractholders. These factors are of concern to policyholders, contractholders, agents, sales intermediaries and lenders. Ratings are not evaluations directed to the protection of investors in our securities. They are not ratings of our securities and should not be relied upon when making a decision to buy, hold or sell our securities, including the common stock offered in this offering. In addition, the standards used by rating agencies in determining financial strength are different from capital requirements set by state insurance regulators. We may need to take actions in response to changing standards set by any of the ratings agencies, as well as statutory capital requirements, which could cause our business and operations to suffer.

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If our reserves for future policy benefits and claims are inadequate, we may be required to increase our reserve liabilities, which could adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition.

We calculate and maintain reserves for estimated future benefit payments to our policyholders and contractholders in accordance with U.S. GAAP and industry accounting practices. We release these reserves as those future obligations are extinguished. The reserves we establish necessarily reflect estimates and actuarial assumptions with regard to our future experience. These estimates and actuarial assumptions involve the exercise of significant judgment. Our future financial results depend significantly upon the extent to which our actual future experience is consistent with the assumptions we have used in pricing our products and determining our reserves. Many factors can affect future experience, including economic and social conditions, inflation, healthcare costs, changes in doctrines of legal liability and damage awards in litigation. Therefore, we cannot determine with complete precision the ultimate amounts we will pay for actual future benefits or the timing of those payments.

We continually monitor our reserves. If we conclude that our reserves are insufficient to cover actual or expected policy and contract benefits and claims payments, we would be required to increase our reserves and incur income statement charges for the period in which we make the determination, which could adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition.

As a holding company, we depend on the ability of our subsidiaries to transfer funds to us to pay dividends and to meet our obligations.

We act as a holding company for our insurance subsidiaries and do not have any significant operations of our own. Dividends from our subsidiaries and permitted payments to us under our tax sharing arrangements with our subsidiaries are our principal sources of cash to pay stockholder dividends and to meet our obligations. These obligations include our operating expenses, interest and principal on our current and any future borrowings and contract adjustment payments on our Equity Units. These obligations also include amounts we owe to GE under the tax matters agreement that we and GE entered into in connection with our initial public offering, which we refer to as the IPO. If the cash we receive from our subsidiaries pursuant to dividend payment and tax sharing arrangements is insufficient for us to fund any of these obligations, we may be required to raise cash through the incurrence of debt, the issuance of additional equity or the sale of assets.

The payment of dividends and other distributions to us by our insurance subsidiaries is regulated by insurance laws and regulations. In general, dividends in excess of prescribed limits are deemed “extraordinary” and require insurance regulatory approval. In addition, insurance regulators may prohibit the payment of ordinary dividends or other payments by our insurance subsidiaries to us (such as a payment under a tax sharing agreement or for employee or other services) if they determine that such payment could be adverse to our policyholders or contractholders. The ability of our insurance subsidiaries to pay dividends to us, and our ability to pay dividends to our stockholders, are also subject to various conditions imposed by the rating agencies for us to maintain our ratings.

Some of our investments are relatively illiquid.

Our investments in privately placed fixed maturities, mortgage loans, policy loans, limited partnership interests and restricted investments held by securitization entities are relatively illiquid. These asset classes represented 31% of the carrying value of our total cash and invested assets as of December 31, 2004. If we require significant amounts of cash on short notice in excess of our normal cash requirements, we may have difficulty selling these investments in a timely manner, be forced to sell them for less than we otherwise would have been able to realize, or both. For example, our floating-rate funding agreements generally contain “put” provisions, through which the contractholder may terminate the funding agreement for any reason after giving notice within the contract’s specified notice period, which is generally 90 days. As of December 31, 2004, we had an aggregate of $2.8 billion of floating-rate funding agreements outstanding, compared to $2.9 billion as of

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December 31, 2003. Of the $2.8 billion aggregate amount outstanding as of December 31, 2004, $1.6 billion had put option features, including $1.5 billion with put option features of 90 days. If an unexpected number of contractholders exercise this right and we are unable to access other liquidity sources, we may have to liquidate assets quickly. Our inability to quickly dispose of illiquid investments could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

Intense competition could negatively affect our ability to maintain or increase our market share and profitability.

Our businesses are subject to intense competition. We believe the principal competitive factors in the sale of our products are product features, price, commission structure, marketing and distribution arrangements, brand, reputation, financial strength ratings and service.

Many other companies actively compete for sales in our protection and retirement income and investments markets, including other major insurers, banks, other financial institutions, mutual fund and money asset management firms and specialty providers. The principal direct and indirect competitors for our mortgage insurance business include other private mortgage insurers, as well as federal and state governmental and quasigovernmental agencies in the U.S., including the Federal Housing Administration, or FHA, and to a lesser degree, the Veterans Administration, or VA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. We also compete in our mortgage insurance business with structured transactions in the capital markets and with other financial instruments designed to manage credit risk, such as credit default swaps and credit linked notes, with lenders who forego mortgage insurance, or self-insure, on loans held in their portfolios, and with lenders that provide mortgage reinsurance through captive mortgage reinsurance programs. In Canada and some European countries, our mortgage insurance business competes directly with government entities, which provide comparable mortgage insurance. Government entities with which we compete typically do not have the same capital requirements and do not have the same profit objectives as we do. Although private companies, such as our company, establish pricing terms for their products to achieve targeted returns, these government entities may offer products on terms designed to accomplish social or political objectives or reflect other non-economic goals.

In many of our product lines, we face competition from competitors that have greater market share or breadth of distribution, offer a broader range of products, services or features, assume a greater level of risk, have lower profitability expectations or have higher financial strength ratings than we do. Many competitors offer similar products and use similar distribution channels. The substantial expansion of banks’ and insurance companies’ distribution capacities and expansion of product features in recent years have intensified pressure on margins and production levels and have increased the level of competition in many of our business lines.

We may be unable to attract and retain independent sales intermediaries and dedicated sales specialists.

We distribute our products through financial intermediaries, independent producers and dedicated sales specialists. We compete with other financial institutions to attract and retain commercial relationships in each of these channels, and our success in competing for sales through these sales intermediaries depends upon factors such as the amount of sales commissions and fees we pay, the breadth of our product offerings, the strength of our brand, our perceived stability and our financial strength ratings, the marketing and services we provide to them and the strength of the relationships we maintain with individuals at those firms. From time to time, due to competitive forces, we have experienced unusually high attrition in particular sales channels for specific products, including long-term care insurance. We believe the decline in long-term care insurance sales specialists was due in part to an intentional refocusing on more productive sales specialists and generally a more difficult environment for long-term care insurance sales. An inability to recruit productive independent sales intermediaries and dedicated sales specialists, or our inability to retain strong relationships with the individual agents at our independent sales intermediaries, could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

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Reinsurance may not be available, affordable or adequate to protect us against losses.

As part of our overall risk and capacity management strategy, we purchase reinsurance for certain risks underwritten by our various business segments. Market conditions beyond our control determine the availability and cost of the reinsurance protection we purchase. Accordingly, we may be forced to incur additional expenses for reinsurance or may not be able to obtain sufficient reinsurance on acceptable terms which could adversely affect our ability to write future business.

If the counterparties to our reinsurance arrangements or to the derivative instruments we use to hedge our business risks default or fail to perform, we may be exposed to risks we had sought to mitigate, which could adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations.

We use reinsurance and derivative instruments to mitigate our risks in various circumstances. Reinsurance does not relieve us of our direct liability to our policyholders, even when the reinsurer is liable to us. Accordingly, we bear credit risk with respect to our reinsurers. We cannot assure you that our reinsurers will pay the reinsurance recoverable owed to us now or in the future or that they will pay these recoverables on a timely basis. A reinsurer’s insolvency, inability or unwillingness to make payments under the terms of its reinsurance agreement with us could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

Prior to the completion of the IPO, we ceded to Union Fidelity Life Insurance Company, an indirect subsidiary of GE, or UFLIC, effective as of January 1, 2004, policy obligations under our structured settlement contracts, which had reserves of $12.0 billion, and our variable annuity contracts, which had general account reserves of $2.8 billion and separate account reserves of $7.9 billion, in each case as of December 31, 2003. These contracts represent substantially all of our contracts that were in force as of December 31, 2003 for these products. In addition, effective as of January 1, 2004, we ceded to UFLIC policy obligations under a block of long-term care insurance policies that we reinsured from The Travelers Insurance Company, or Travelers, which had reserves of $1.5 billion as of December 31, 2003. UFLIC has established trust accounts for our benefit to secure its obligations under the reinsurance arrangements, and General Electric Capital Corporation, an indirect subsidiary of GE, or GE Capital, has agreed to maintain UFLIC’s risk-based capital above a specified minimum level. If UFLIC becomes insolvent notwithstanding this agreement, and the amounts in the trust accounts are insufficient to pay UFLIC’s obligations to us, our financial condition and results of operations could be materially adversely affected.

In addition, we use derivative instruments to hedge various business risks. We enter into a variety of derivative instruments, including options, forwards, interest rate and currency swaps and options to enter into interest rate and currency swaps with a number of counterparties. If our counterparties fail or refuse to honor their obligations under the derivative instruments, our hedges of the related risk will be ineffective. Such failure could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

Fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates and international securities markets could negatively affect our profitability.

Our international operations generate revenues denominated in local currencies. For the years ended December 31, 2004, 2003 and 2002, 19%, 18% and 14% of our revenues, respectively, and 29%, 26% and 12% of our net earnings from continuing operations, respectively, were generated by our international operations. We generally invest cash generated by our international operations in securities denominated in local currencies. As of December 31, 2004 and 2003, approximately 8% and 5%, respectively, of our invested assets were held by our international operations and were invested primarily in non-U.S.-denominated securities. Although investing in securities denominated in local currencies limits the effect of currency exchange rate fluctuation on local operating results, we remain exposed to the impact of fluctuations in exchange rates as we translate the operating results of our foreign operations into our financial statements. We currently do not hedge this exposure, and as a result, period-to-period comparability of our results of operations is affected by fluctuations in exchange rates. For example, our net earnings for the year ended December 31, 2004 included approximately $31 million due to

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the favorable impact of changes in foreign exchange rates. In addition, because we derive a significant portion of our earnings from non-U.S.-denominated revenue, our results of operations could be adversely affected to the extent the dollar value of non-U.S.-denominated revenue is reduced due to a strengthening U.S. dollar.

Our investments in non-U.S.-denominated securities are subject to fluctuations in non-U.S. securities and currency markets, and those markets can be volatile. Non-U.S. currency fluctuations also affect the value of any dividends paid by our non-U.S. subsidiaries to their parent companies in the U.S.

Our insurance businesses are heavily regulated, and changes in regulation may reduce our profitability and limit our growth.

Our insurance operations are subject to a wide variety of laws and regulations. State insurance laws regulate most aspects of our U.S. insurance businesses, and our insurance subsidiaries are regulated by the insurance departments of the states in which they are domiciled and licensed. Our non-U.S. insurance operations are principally regulated by insurance regulatory authorities in the jurisdictions in which they are domiciled.

State laws in the U.S. grant insurance regulatory authorities broad administrative powers with respect to, among other things:

State insurance regulators and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, or NAIC, regularly reexamine existing laws and regulations applicable to insurance companies and their products. Changes in these laws and regulations, or in interpretations thereof, are often made for the benefit of the consumer at the expense of the insurer and thus could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

In December 2004, the NAIC approved amendments to the NAIC’s model Producer Licensing Act. The amendments contain new disclosure requirements for producers regarding compensation arrangements. If adopted, the NAIC amendments would require producers to disclose to customers, in certain circumstances, information concerning compensation arrangements. The NAIC also directed its Executive Task Force on Broker Activities to give further consideration to the development of additional requirements for recognition of a fiduciary responsibility on the part of producers, disclosure of all quotes received by a broker and disclosures relating to reinsurance arrangements between insurers and reinsurance companies affiliated with a producer. We cannot predict the effect that the NAIC’s recent compensation disclosure amendments or anticipated future activities in this area, at the NAIC or state level, will have on influencing future legal actions, changes to business practices or regulatory requirements applicable to us.

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Our mortgage insurance business is subject to additional laws and regulations. For a discussion of the risks associated with those laws and regulations, see “—Risks Relating to Our Mortgage Insurance Business—Changes in regulations that affect the mortgage insurance business could affect our operations significantly and could reduce the demand for mortgage insurance.”

Currently, the U.S. federal government does not regulate directly the business of insurance. However, federal legislation and administrative policies in several areas can significantly and adversely affect insurance companies. These areas include financial services regulation, securities regulation, pension regulation, privacy, tort reform legislation and taxation. In addition, various forms of direct federal regulation of insurance have been proposed. These proposals include “The State Modernization and Regulatory Transparency Act,” which would maintain state-based regulation of insurance but would affect state regulation of certain aspects of the business of insurance including rates, agent and company licensing, and market conduct examinations. We cannot predict whether this or other proposals will be adopted, or what impact, if any, such proposals or, if enacted, such laws may have on our business, financial condition or results of operation.

Our international operations are subject to regulation in the relevant jurisdictions in which they operate, which in many ways is similar to that of the state regulation outlined above.

Many of our customers and independent sales intermediaries also operate in regulated environments. Changes in the regulations that affect their operations also may affect our business relationships with them and their ability to purchase or to distribute our products. Accordingly, these changes could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operation.

Compliance with applicable laws and regulations is time consuming and personnel-intensive, and changes in these laws and regulations may increase materially our direct and indirect compliance and other expenses of doing business, thus having an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

Legal and regulatory investigations and actions are increasingly common in the insurance business and may result in financial losses and harm our reputation.

We face a significant risk of litigation and regulatory investigations and actions in the ordinary course of operating our businesses, including the risk of class action lawsuits. Our pending legal and regulatory actions include proceedings specific to us and others generally applicable to business practices in the industries in which we operate. In our insurance operations, we are or may become subject to class actions and individual suits alleging, among other things, issues relating to sales or underwriting practices, payment of contingent or other sales commissions, claims payments and procedures, product design, disclosure, administration, additional premium charges for premiums paid on a periodic basis, denial or delay of benefits and breaches of fiduciary or other duties to customers. Plaintiffs in class action and other lawsuits against us may seek very large or indeterminate amounts, including punitive and treble damages, which may remain unknown for substantial periods of time. We are also subject to various regulatory inquiries, such as information requests, subpoenas and books and record examinations, from state, federal and international regulators and other authorities. A substantial legal liability or a significant regulatory action against us could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations. Moreover, even if we ultimately prevail in the litigation, regulatory action or investigation, we could suffer significant reputational harm, which could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Recently, the insurance industry has become the focus of increased scrutiny by regulatory and law enforcement authorities concerning certain practices within the insurance industry. In this regard, in May 2005, we received a subpoena from the Northeast Regional Office of the SEC, requiring the production of documents related to “certain loss mitigation insurance products,” such as finite risk reinsurance. We are cooperating fully with the SEC with respect to its subpoena. Additionally, in May and June 2005, certain of our subsidiaries received information requests from the State of Delaware Department of Insurance and the State of Connecticut

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Insurance Department on the same general subject. In June 2005, GE received a subpoena from the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, also on the same general subject. In the subpoena, GE is defined as including, among other things, its subsidiaries and affiliates. We are cooperating with GE in connection with GE’s response to the subpoena. In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority has initiated an industry-wide review of payment protection insurance products, as well as an industry-wide review of non-traditional financial arrangements. Also, in May 2005, each of our U.S. mortgage insurance subsidiaries received an information request from the State of New York Insurance Department with respect to captive reinsurance transactions with lender-affiliated reinsurers and other types of arrangements in which lending institutions receive from our subsidiary any form of payment, compensation or other consideration in connection with issuance of a policy covering a mortgagor of the lending institution. We are also cooperating with respect to these industry-wide regulatory inquiries.

This industry scrutiny also includes the commencement of investigations and other proceedings by the New York State Attorney General and other governmental authorities relating to allegations of improper conduct in connection with the payment of, and the failure to disclose, contingent commissions by insurance companies to insurance brokers and agents, the solicitation and provision of fictitious or inflated quotes, the use of inducements to brokers or companies in the sale of insurance products and the use of captive reinsurance arrangements. We have not received a subpoena or inquiry from the State of New York with respect to these matters. However, as part of industry-wide inquiries in this regard, we have received inquiries and informational requests with respect to some of these matters from other federal and state regulatory authorities. We have responded to these inquiries and informational requests and will continue to cooperate with these regulatory authorities.

Recent industry-wide inquiries also include those regarding market timing and late trading in variable annuity contracts, variable annuity sales practices/exchanges and electronic communication document retention practices. In this regard, we responded in late 2003 to a New York State Attorney General subpoena regarding market timing and late trading in variable products and mutual funds. We have not received any further inquiries from the New York State Attorney General regarding these matters, although we received inquiries and informational requests regarding these matters from other federal and state regulatory authorities. We have responded to these inquiries, follow-up inquiries and informational requests and will continue to cooperate with these regulatory authorities.

We cannot assure you that the current investigations and proceedings will not have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition or results of operations. It is also possible that related investigations and proceedings may be commenced in the future, and we could become subject to further investigations and have lawsuits filed or enforcement actions initiated against us. In addition, increased regulatory scrutiny and any resulting investigations or proceedings could result in new legal precedents and industry-wide regulations or practices that could adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operation.

We have significant operations in India that could be adversely affected by changes in the political or economic stability of India or government policies in India, the U.S. or Europe.

Through an arrangement with an outsourcing provider that is 40% owned by GE, we have a substantial team of professionals in India who provide a variety of services to our insurance operations, including customer service, transaction processing, and functional support including finance, investment research, actuarial, risk and marketing. The development of an operations center in India has been facilitated partly by the liberalization policies pursued by the Indian government over the past decade. The current government of India, formed in October 1999, has announced policies and taken initiatives that support the continued economic liberalization policies that have been pursued by previous governments. However, we cannot assure you that these liberalization policies will continue in the future. The rate of economic liberalization could change, and specific laws and policies affecting our business could change as well. A significant change in India’s economic liberalization and deregulation policies could adversely affect business and economic conditions in India generally and our business in particular.

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The political or regulatory climate in the U.S., Europe or elsewhere also could change so that it would not be practical or legal for us to use international operations centers, such as call centers. For example, changes in privacy regulations, or more stringent interpretation or enforcement of these regulations, could require us to curtail our use of low-cost operations in India to service our businesses, which could reduce the cost benefits we currently realize from using these operations.

Our computer systems may fail or their security may be compromised, which could damage our business and adversely affect our financial condition and results of operation.

Our business is highly dependent upon the uninterrupted operation of our computer systems. We rely on these systems throughout our business for a variety of functions, including processing claims and applications, providing information to customers and distributors, performing actuarial analyses and maintaining financial records. Despite the implementation of security measures, our computer systems may be vulnerable to physical or electronic intrusions, computer viruses or other attacks, programming errors and similar disruptive problems. The failure of these systems for any reason could cause significant interruptions to our operations, which could result in a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition or results of operation.

We retain confidential information in our computer systems, and we rely on sophisticated commercial technologies to maintain the security of those systems. Anyone who is able to circumvent our security measures and penetrate our computer systems could access, view, misappropriate, alter, or delete any information in the systems, including personally identifiable customer information and proprietary business information. In addition, an increasing number of states and foreign countries require that customers be notified if a security breach results in the disclosure of personally identifiable customer information. Any compromise of the security of our computer systems that results in inappropriate disclosure of personally identifiable customer information could damage our reputation in the marketplace, deter people from purchasing our products, subject us to significant civil and criminal liability and require us to incur significant technical, legal and other expenses.

The occurrence of natural or man-made disasters could adversely affect our financial condition and results of operation.

We are exposed to various risks arising out of natural disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, floods and tornadoes, or man-made disasters, including acts of terrorism and military actions. For example, a natural or man-made disaster could lead to unexpected changes in persistency rates as policyholders and contractholders who are affected by the disaster may be unable to meet their contractual obligations, such as payment of premiums on our insurance policies, deposits into our investment products, and mortgage payments on loans insured by our mortgage insurance policies. The continued threat of terrorism and ongoing military actions may cause significant volatility in global financial markets, and a natural or man-made disaster could trigger an economic downturn in the areas directly or indirectly affected by the disaster. These consequences could, among other things, result in a decline in business and increased claims from those areas, as well as an adverse effect on home prices in those areas, which could result in increased loss experience in our mortgage insurance business. Disasters also could disrupt public and private infrastructure, including communications and financial services, which could disrupt our normal business operations.

A natural or man-made disaster also could disrupt the operations of our counterparties or result in increased prices for the products and services they provide to us. For example, a natural or man-made disaster could lead to increased reinsurance prices and potentially cause us to retain more risk than we otherwise would retain if we were able to obtain reinsurance at lower prices. In addition, a disaster could adversely affect the value of the assets in our investment portfolio if it affects companies’ ability to pay principal or interest on their securities. See “—We may face losses if there are significant deviations from our assumptions regarding the future persistency of our insurance policies and annuity contracts” and “—A deterioration in economic conditions or a decline in home price appreciation may adversely affect our loss experience in mortgage insurance.”

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Risks Relating to Our Protection and Retirement Income and Investments Segments

We may face losses if morbidity rates, mortality rates or unemployment rates differ significantly from our pricing expectations.

We set prices for our insurance and some annuity products based upon expected claims and payment patterns, using assumptions for, among other things, morbidity rates, or likelihood of sickness, and mortality rates, or likelihood of death, of our policyholders and contractholders. The long-term profitability of these products depends upon how our actual experience compares with our pricing assumptions. For example, if morbidity rates are higher, or mortality rates are lower, than our pricing assumptions, we could be required to make greater payments under long-term care insurance policies and annuity contracts than we had projected. Conversely, if mortality rates are higher than our pricing assumptions, we could be required to make greater payments under our life and payment protection insurance policies and annuity contracts with guaranteed minimum death benefits than we had projected.

The risk that our claims experience may differ significantly from our pricing assumptions is particularly significant for our long-term care insurance products. Long-term care insurance policies provide for long-duration coverage and, therefore, our actual claims experience will emerge over many years after pricing assumptions have been established. Moreover, as a relatively new product in the market, long-term care insurance does not have the extensive claims experience history of life insurance, and as a result, our ability to forecast future claim rates for long-term care insurance is more limited than for life insurance.

In pricing our payment protection insurance, we also use assumptions regarding unemployment levels. If unemployment levels are higher than our pricing assumptions, the claims frequency could be higher for our payment protection insurance business than we had projected.

We may be required to accelerate the amortization of deferred acquisition costs and the present value of future profits, which would increase our expenses and reduce profitability.

Deferred acquisition costs, or DAC, represent costs which vary with and are primarily related to the sale and issuance of our insurance policies and investment contracts that are deferred and amortized over the estimated life of the related insurance policies. These costs include commissions in excess of ultimate renewal commissions, solicitation and printing costs, sales material and some support costs, such as underwriting and contract and policy issuance expenses. Under U.S. GAAP, DAC is subsequently amortized to income, over the lives of the underlying contracts, in relation to the anticipated recognition of premiums or gross profits. In addition, when we acquire a block of insurance policies or investment contracts, we assign a portion of the purchase price to the right to receive future net cash flows from existing insurance and investment contracts and policies. This intangible asset, called the present value of future profits, or PVFP, represents the actuarially estimated present value of future cash flows from the acquired policies. We amortize the value of this intangible asset in a manner similar to the amortization of DAC.

Our amortization of DAC and PVFP generally depends upon anticipated profits from investments, surrender and other policy and contract charges, mortality, morbidity and maintenance expense margins. Unfavorable experience with regard to expected expenses, investment returns, mortality, morbidity, withdrawals or lapses may cause us to increase the amortization of DAC or PVFP, or both, or to record a charge to increase benefit reserves.

We regularly review DAC and PVFP to determine if they are recoverable from future income. If these costs are not recoverable, they are charged to expenses in the financial period in which we make this determination. For example, if we determine that we are unable to recover DAC from profits over the life of a block of insurance policies or annuity contracts, or if withdrawals or surrender charges associated with early withdrawals do not fully offset the unamortized acquisition costs related to those policies or annuities, we would be required to recognize the additional DAC amortization as a current-period expense. As of December 31, 2004 and 2003,

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respectively, we had $5.0 billion and $5.8 billion of DAC, and $0.7 billion and $1.2 billion of PVFP. Our net amortization of DAC and PVFP was $1.1 billion, $1.3 billion and $1.2 billion of DAC and PVFP for the years ended December 31, 2004, 2003 and 2002, respectively.

We may be required to recognize impairment in the value of our goodwill, which would increase our expenses and reduce our profitability.

Goodwill represents the excess of the amount we paid to acquire our subsidiaries and other businesses over the fair value of their net assets at the date of the acquisition. Under U.S. GAAP, we test the carrying value of goodwill for impairment at least annually at the “reporting unit” level, which is either an operating segment or a business one level below the operating segment. Goodwill is impaired if the fair value of the reporting unit as a whole is less than the fair value of the identifiable assets and liabilities of the reporting unit, plus the carrying value of goodwill, at the date of the test. For example, goodwill may become impaired if the fair value of a reporting unit as a whole were to decline by an amount greater than the decline in the value of its individual identifiable assets and liabilities. This may occur for various reasons, including changes in actual or expected earnings or cash flows of a reporting unit, generation of earnings by a reporting unit at a lower rate of return than similar businesses or declines in market prices for publicly traded businesses similar to our reporting units. If any portion of our goodwill becomes impaired, we would be required to recognize the amount of the impairment as a current-period expense. When we adopted Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 142 with respect to recognizing impairment of goodwill, effective January 1, 2002, we recognized a $376 million impairment, net of tax, relating to our domestic auto and homeowners’ insurance business (included in discontinued operations), primarily as a result of heightened price competition in the auto insurance industry.

Our reputation in the long-term care insurance market may be adversely affected if we were to raise premiums on our in-force long-term care insurance products.

Unlike several of our competitors, we have never increased premiums on any in-force long-term care policies that we have issued. Although the terms of all our long-term care insurance policies permit us to increase premiums during the premium-paying period, any implementation of a premium increase could have an adverse effect on our reputation, our ability to market and sell new long-term care insurance products and our ability to retain existing policyholders.

Medical advances, such as genetic research and diagnostic imaging, and related legislation could adversely affect the financial performance of our life insurance, long-term care insurance and annuities businesses.

Genetic research includes procedures focused on identifying key genes that render an individual predisposed to specific diseases, such as particular types of cancer and other diseases. Other medical advances, such as diagnostic imaging technologies, also may be used to detect the early onset of diseases such as cancer and cardiovascular disease. We believe that if individuals learn through medical advances that they are predisposed to particular conditions that may reduce life longevity or require long-term care, they will be more likely to purchase our life and long-term care insurance policies or not to permit existing polices to lapse. In contrast, if individuals learn that they lack the genetic predisposition to develop the conditions that reduce longevity or require long-term care, they will be less likely to purchase our life and long-term care insurance products but more likely to purchase certain annuity products. In addition, such individuals that are existing policyholders will be more likely to permit their policies to lapse.

If we were to gain access to the same genetic or medical information as our prospective policyholders and contractholders, then we would be able to take this information into account in pricing our life and long-term care insurance policies and annuity contracts. However, there are a number of regulatory proposals that would make genetic and other medical information confidential and unavailable to insurance companies. The U.S. Senate has approved a bill that would prohibit group health plans, health insurers and employers from making enrollment decisions or adjusting premiums on the basis of genetic testing information. This legislation is now pending before

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a committee at the House of Representatives. Legislators in certain states also have introduced similar legislation. If these regulatory proposals were enacted, prospective policyholders and contractholders would only disclose this information if they chose to do so voluntarily. These factors could lead us to reduce sales of products affected by these regulatory proposals and could result in a deterioration of the risk profile of our portfolio, which could lead to payments to our policyholders and contractholders that are higher than we anticipated.

Medical advances also could lead to new forms of preventative care. Preventative care could extend the life and improve the overall health of individuals. If this were to occur, the duration of payments under certain of our annuity products likely would increase, thereby reducing net earnings in that business.

We may face losses if there are significant deviations from our assumptions regarding the future persistency of our insurance policies and annuity contracts.

The prices and expected future profitability of our insurance and deferred annuity products are based in part upon expected patterns of premiums, expenses and benefits, using a number of assumptions, including those related to persistency, which is the probability that a policy or contract will remain in-force from one period to the next. The effect of persistency on profitability varies for different products. For most of our life insurance, group life and health insurance, and deferred annuity products, actual persistency that is lower than our persistency assumptions could have an adverse impact on profitability, especially in the early years of a policy or contract primarily because we would be required to accelerate the amortization of expenses we deferred in connection with the acquisition of the policy or contract. For our life insurance policies, increased persistency that is the result of the sale of policies to third parties that continue to make premium payments on policies that would otherwise have lapsed, also known as life settlements, could have an adverse impact on profitability because of the higher claims rate associated with settled policies. For the years ended December 31, 2004, 2003 and 2002, persistency in our life insurance and fixed annuity businesses has been slightly higher than assumed, while persistency in our variable annuity and certain group life and health insurance products has been slightly lower than we had assumed.

For our long-term care insurance and some other health insurance policies, actual persistency in later policy durations that is higher than our persistency assumptions could have a negative impact on profitability. If these policies remain in-force longer than we assumed, then we could be required to make greater benefit payments than we had anticipated when we priced these products. This risk is particularly significant in our long-term care insurance business because we do not have the experience history that we have in many of our other businesses. As a result, our ability to predict persistency for long-term care insurance is more limited than for many other products. Some of our long-term care insurance policies have experienced higher persistency than we had assumed, which has resulted in adverse claims experience.

Because our assumptions regarding persistency experience are inherently uncertain, reserves for future policy benefits and claims may prove to be inadequate if actual persistency experience is different from those assumptions. Although some of our products permit us to increase premiums during the life of the policy or contract, we cannot guarantee that these increases would be sufficient to maintain profitability. Moreover, many of our products do not permit us to increase premiums or limit those increases during the life of the policy or contract. Significant deviations in experience from pricing expectations regarding persistency could have an adverse effect on the profitability of our products.

Regulation XXX may have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations by requiring us to increase our statutory reserves for term life and universal life insurance or incur higher operating costs.

The Model Regulation entitled “Valuation of Life Insurance Policies,” commonly known as “Regulation XXX,” requires insurers to establish additional statutory reserves for term and universal life insurance policies with long-term premium guarantees. Virtually all our newly issued term and universal life insurance business is now affected by Regulation XXX.

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In response to this regulation, we have increased term and universal life insurance statutory reserves and changed our premium rates for term life insurance products. We also have implemented reinsurance and capital management actions to mitigate the impact of Regulation XXX. However, we cannot assure you that there will not be regulatory or other challenges to the actions we have taken to date. The result of those challenges could require us to increase statutory reserves or incur higher operating costs. Any change to or repeal of Regulation XXX could reduce the competitive advantage of our reinsurance and capital management actions in response to Regulation XXX and could adversely affect our market position in the life insurance market.

We also cannot assure you that we will be able to continue to implement actions to mitigate the impact of Regulation XXX on future sales of term and universal life insurance products. If we are unable to continue to implement those actions, we may be required to increase statutory reserves, incur higher operating costs than we currently anticipate, or reduce our sales of these products. We also may have to implement measures that may be disruptive to our business. For example, because term and universal life insurance are particularly price-sensitive products, any increase in premiums charged on these products in order to compensate us for the increased statutory reserve requirements or higher costs of reinsurance may result in a significant loss of volume and adversely affect our life insurance operations.

If demand for long-term care insurance continues to decline, we will not be able to execute our strategy to expand our business in this market.

We have devoted significant resources to developing our long-term care insurance business, and our growth strategy relies partly upon continued growth of this market. In recent years, however, sales of individual long-term care insurance have declined. Annualized first-year premiums for individual long-term care insurance peaked in 2002 at approximately $1.0 billion and decreased by 7% in 2003 and 25% in 2004, according to LIMRA International. We believe this decrease was due primarily to decisions by several providers to cease offering long-term care insurance, to raise premiums on in-force policies and/or to introduce new products with higher prices. These actions resulted in decreased purchases of long-term care insurance products and have caused some distributors to reduce their sales focus on these products. As a result, our annualized first-year premiums of long-term care insurance decreased from $257 million for the year ended December 31, 2002 to $240 million and $162 million for the years ended December 31, 2003 and 2004, respectively. If the market for long-term care insurance continues to decline, we may be unable to realize our growth strategy in this area and our financial condition and results of operations could be adversely affected.

Changes in tax laws could make some of our products less attractive to consumers.

Changes in tax laws could make some of our products less attractive to consumers. For example, in May 2003, U.S. President George Bush signed into law the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, which reduced the federal income tax that investors are required to pay on long-term capital gains and on some dividends paid on stock. This reduction may provide an incentive for some of our customers and potential customers to shift assets into mutual funds and away from products, including annuities, designed to defer taxes payable on investment returns. Because the income taxes payable on long-term capital gains and some dividends paid on stock have been reduced, investors may decide that the tax-deferral benefits of annuity contracts are less advantageous than the potential after-tax income benefits of mutual funds or other investment products that provide dividends and long-term capital gains. A shift away from annuity contracts and other tax-deferred products would reduce our income from sales of these products, as well as the assets upon which we earn investment income.

We cannot predict whether any other legislation will be enacted, what the specific terms of any such legislation will be or how, if at all, this legislation or any other legislation could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

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Changes in U.S. federal and state securities laws may affect our operations and our profitability.

U.S. federal and state securities laws apply to investment products that are also “securities,” including variable annuities and variable life insurance policies. As a result, some of our subsidiaries and the policies and contracts they offer are subject to regulation under these federal and state securities laws. Our insurance subsidiaries’ separate accounts are registered as investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Some variable annuity contracts and variable life insurance policies issued by our insurance subsidiaries also are registered under the Securities Act of 1933. Other subsidiaries are registered as broker-dealers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and are members of, and subject to, regulation by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. In addition, some of our subsidiaries also are registered as investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

Securities laws and regulations are primarily intended to ensure the integrity of the financial markets and to protect investors in the securities markets or investment advisory or brokerage clients. These laws and regulations generally grant supervisory agencies broad administrative powers, including the power to limit or restrict the conduct of business for failure to comply with those laws and regulations. Changes to these laws or regulations that restrict the conduct of our business could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

Risks Relating to Our Mortgage Insurance Segment

Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and a small number of large mortgage lenders exert significant influence over the U.S. mortgage insurance market.

Our mortgage insurance products protect mortgage lenders and investors from default-related losses on residential first mortgage loans made primarily to home buyers with high loan-to-value mortgages—generally, those home buyers who make down payments of less than 20% of their home’s purchase price. The largest purchasers and guarantors of mortgage loans in the U.S. are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were created by Congressional charter to ensure that mortgage lenders have sufficient funds to continue to finance home purchases. For the year ended December 31, 2004, Fannie Mae purchased approximately 18.8% of all the mortgage loans originated in the U.S., and Freddie Mac purchased approximately 13.0%, according to statistics published by Inside the GSEs. Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s charters generally prohibit them from purchasing any mortgage with a face amount that exceeds 80% of the home’s value, unless that mortgage is insured by a qualified insurer or the mortgage seller retains at least a 10% participation in the loan or agrees to repurchase the loan in the event of default. As a result, high loan-to-value mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac generally are insured with private mortgage insurance. These provisions in Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s charters create much of the demand for private mortgage insurance in the U.S. For the year ended December 31, 2004, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased approximately 68% of the flow mortgage loans that we insured. As a result, a change in these provisions relating to their purchase or guarantee activity could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

In addition, increasing consolidation among mortgage lenders in recent years has resulted in significant customer concentration for U.S. mortgage insurers. Ten mortgage lenders accounted for approximately 27% of our flow new insurance written for the year ended December 31, 2004.

As a result of the significant concentration in mortgage originators and purchasers, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the largest mortgage lenders possess substantial market power which enables them to influence our business and the mortgage insurance industry in general. Although we actively monitor and develop our relationships with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and our largest mortgage lending customers, a deterioration in any of these relationships, or the loss of business from any of our key customers, could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

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Our mortgage insurance business is one of the members of the Mortgage Insurance Companies of America, or MICA. In 1999, several large mortgage lenders and a coalition of financial services and housing-related trade associations, including MICA, formed FM Watch, now known as FM Policy Focus, a lobbying organization that supports expanded federal oversight and legislation relating to the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have criticized and lobbied against the positions taken by FM Policy Focus. These lobbying activities could, among other things, polarize Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and members of FM Policy Focus. As a result of this possible polarization, our relationships with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may limit our opportunities to do business with some mortgage lenders, and our relationships with mortgage lenders who are members of FM Policy Focus may limit our ability to do business with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as with mortgage lenders who are not members of FM Policy Focus and are opposed to these efforts. Any of these outcomes could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

Results from investigations into Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s accounting practices, disclosures and other matters may result in legislative or regulatory changes governing the operations of Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and other government-sponsored enterprises, which could adversely affect the results of our U.S. mortgage insurance business.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are subject to ongoing investigations regarding their accounting practices, disclosures and other matters. These investigations may contribute to changes in legislation and regulations governing their operations and the operations of other government-sponsored enterprises. Legislation proposing increased regulatory oversight over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is currently under consideration in both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives. We cannot predict whether any such legislation or regulations will be enacted or adopted, how they may affect the operations of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or other government-sponsored enterprises, or how they may affect our operations, financial condition and results of operations.

A decrease in the volume of high loan-to-value home mortgage originations or an increase in the volume of mortgage insurance cancellations could result in a decline in our revenue.

We provide mortgage insurance primarily for high loan-to-value mortgages. Factors that could lead to a decrease in the volume of high loan-to-value mortgage originations include:

A decline in the volume of high loan-to-value mortgage originations would reduce the demand for mortgage insurance and, therefore, could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

In addition, a significant percentage of the premiums we earn each year in our U.S. mortgage insurance business are renewal premiums from insurance policies written in previous years. We estimate that approximately 85% and 70% of our U.S. gross premiums written for the years ended December 31, 2004 and 2003, respectively, were renewal premiums. As a result, the length of time insurance remains in force is an important determinant of our mortgage insurance revenues. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and many other mortgage

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investors in the U.S. generally permit a homeowner to ask his loan servicer to cancel his mortgage insurance when the principal amount of the mortgage falls below 80% of the home’s value. Factors that tend to reduce the length of time our mortgage insurance remains in force include:

These factors contributed to a decrease in our U.S. policy persistency rates from 57% for the year ended December 31, 2002 to 46% for the year ended December 31, 2003. Although U.S. policy persistency rates increased to 65% for the year ended December 31, 2004, a further increase in the volume of mortgage insurance cancellations in the U.S. generally would reduce the amount of our insurance in force and have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations. These factors are less significant in our international mortgage insurance operations because we generally receive a single payment for mortgage insurance at the time a loan closes, and this premium typically is not refundable if the policy is canceled.

Continued increases in the volume of “simultaneous second” mortgages could have an adverse effect on the U.S. market for mortgage insurance.

High loan-to-value mortgages can consist of two simultaneous loans, known as “simultaneous seconds,” comprising a first mortgage with a loan-to-value ratio of 80% and a simultaneous second mortgage for the excess portion of the loan, instead of a single mortgage with a loan-to-value ratio of more than 80%. Simultaneous second loans are sometimes referred to as “80-10-10 loans” because they often comprise a first mortgage with an 80% loan-to-value ratio, a second mortgage with a 10% loan-to-value ratio and the remaining 10% paid in cash by the buyer, rather than a single mortgage with a 90% loan-to-value ratio.

Over the past several years, the volume of simultaneous second loans as an alternative to loans requiring private mortgage insurance has increased substantially. We believe this recent increase reflects the following factors:

Further increases in the volume of simultaneous seconds may cause corresponding decreases in the use of mortgage insurance for high loan-to-value mortgages, which could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

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The amount of mortgage insurance we write could decline significantly if other alternatives to private mortgage insurance are used to protect against default risk or lower coverage levels of mortgage insurance are selected.

Mortgage default risks may be mitigated through a variety of alternatives to private mortgage insurance other than simultaneous second mortgages. These alternatives include:

A decline in the use of private mortgage insurance in connection with high loan-to-value home mortgages for any reason would reduce the demand for flow mortgage insurance. We believe in recent quarters there has been a reduction in this demand in part as the result of increasing originations of mortgages that do not meet the eligibility requirements of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and mortgages that are securitized in mortgage-backed securities that do not use private mortgage insurance. A prolonged decline of this nature could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

Our claims expenses would increase and our results of operations would suffer if the rate of defaults on mortgages covered by our mortgage insurance increases or the severity of such defaults exceeds our expectations.

Our premium rates vary with the perceived risk of a claim on the insured loan, which takes into account factors such as the loan-to-value ratio, our long-term historical loss experience, whether the mortgage provides for fixed payments or variable payments, the term of the mortgage, the borrower’s credit history and the level of documentation and verification of the borrower’s income and assets. We establish renewal premium rates for the life of a mortgage insurance policy upon issuance, and we cannot cancel the policy or adjust the premiums after the policy is issued. As a result, we cannot offset the impact of unanticipated claims with premium increases on policies in force, and we cannot refuse to renew mortgage insurance coverage. The premiums we agree to charge upon writing a mortgage insurance policy may not adequately compensate us for the risks and costs associated with the coverage we provide for the entire life of that policy.

The long-term profitability of our mortgage insurance business depends upon the accuracy of our pricing assumptions. If defaults on mortgages increase because of an economic downturn or for reasons we failed to take into account adequately, we would be required to make greater claim payments than we planned when we priced our policies. Future claims on our mortgage insurance policies may not match the assumptions made in our pricing. An increase in the amount or frequency of claims beyond the levels contemplated by our pricing assumptions could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations. In recent years, our results of operations have benefited from historically low loss ratios because of significant home price appreciation and low levels of defaults. Increases from these recent historic lows could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

As of December 31, 2004, approximately 80% of our U.S. mortgage insurance risk in force and 72% of our international mortgage insurance risk in force had not yet reached its anticipated highest claim frequency years,

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which are generally between the third and seventh year of the loan. As a result, we expect our loss experience on these loans will increase as policies continue to age. If the claim frequency on the risk in force significantly exceeds the claim frequency that was assumed in setting premium rates, our financial condition, results of operations and cash flows would be adversely affected.

We also provide mortgage insurance for “Alt A” loans, which are originated under programs in which there is a reduced level of verification or disclosure of the borrower’s income or assets. Alt A loans represented 2.8%, 1.9% and 2.5% of our U.S. risk in force as of December 31, 2004, 2003 and 2002, respectively, and we anticipate that there will be increased levels of Alt A loans in future periods. Alt A loans typically have a higher default rate than fully documented loans, and we generally charge higher premiums for mortgage insurance on Alt A loans than on fully documented loans. If defaults on Alt A loans are higher than the assumptions we made in pricing our mortgage insurance on those loans, then we would be required to make greater claims payments than we had projected, which could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

A deterioration in economic conditions or a decline in home price appreciation may adversely affect our loss experience in mortgage insurance.

Losses in our mortgage insurance business generally result from events, such as reduction of income, unemployment, divorce, illness and inability to manage credit and interest-rate levels that reduce a borrower’s ability to continue to make mortgage payments. The amount of the loss we suffer, if any, depends in part on whether the home of a borrower who defaults on a mortgage can be sold for an amount that will cover unpaid principal and interest and the expenses of the sale. A deterioration in economic conditions generally increases the likelihood that borrowers will not have sufficient income to pay their mortgages and can also adversely affect housing values, which increases our risk of loss. A decline in home price appreciation, whether or not in conjunction with deteriorating economic conditions, may also increase our risk of loss.

A substantial economic downturn, or decline in recent significant home-price appreciation across the entire U.S. or globally could have a significant adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations. We also may be particularly affected by economic downturns or declines in recent significant home-price appreciation in states where a large portion of our business is concentrated. As of December 31, 2004, approximately 50% of our U.S. risk in force was concentrated in 10 states, with 8% in Florida, 7% in Texas and 6% in New York. Similarly, our mortgage insurance operations in Canada, Australia and the U.K. are concentrated in the largest cities in those countries. Continued and prolonged adverse economic conditions or declines in recent significant home-price appreciation in these states or cities could result in high levels of claims and losses, which could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

A significant portion of our risk in force consists of loans with high loan-to-value ratios, which generally result in more and larger claims than loans with lower loan-to-value ratios.

Mortgage loans with higher loan-to-value ratios typically have claim incidence rates substantially higher than mortgage loans with lower loan-to-value ratios. In our U.S. mortgage insurance business as of December 31, 2004:

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In Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the risks of having a portfolio with a significant portion of high loan-to-value mortgages are greater than in the U.S. and Europe because we generally agree to cover 100% of the losses associated with mortgage defaults in those markets, compared to percentages in the U.S. and Europe that are typically 12% to 35% of the loan amount. In our non-U.S. mortgage insurance business as of December 31, 2004:

Although mortgage insurance premiums for higher loan-to-value ratio loans generally are higher than for loans with lower loan-to-value ratios, the difference in premium rates may not be sufficient to compensate us for the enhanced risks associated with mortgage loans bearing higher loan-to-value ratios.

We cede a portion of our U.S. mortgage insurance business to mortgage reinsurance companies affiliated with our mortgage lending customers, and this reduces our profitability.

We, like other mortgage insurers, offer opportunities to our mortgage lending customers that are designed to allow them to participate in the risks and rewards of the mortgage insurance business. Many of the major mortgage lenders with which we do business have established captive mortgage reinsurance subsidiaries. These reinsurance subsidiaries assume a portion of the risks associated with the lender’s insured mortgage loans in exchange for a percentage of the premiums. In most cases, our reinsurance coverage is an “excess of loss” arrangement with a limited band of exposure for the reinsurer. This means that we are required to pay the first layer of losses arising from defaults in the covered mortgages, the reinsurer indemnifies us for the next layer of losses, and we pay any losses in excess of the reinsurer’s obligations. The effect of these arrangements historically has been a reduction in the profitability and return on capital of this business to us. Approximately 70% of our U.S. primary new risk written as of December 31, 2004 was subject to captive mortgage reinsurance, compared to approximately 75% as of December 31, 2003. U.S. premiums ceded to these reinsurers were approximately $143 million, $139 million and $113 million for the years ended December 31, 2004, 2003 and 2002, respectively. These premium cessions have adversely affected our profitability and could further reduce profitability if the terms of these arrangements require greater premium cessions.

If efforts by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to reduce the need for mortgage insurance are successful, they could adversely affect the results of our U.S. mortgage insurance business.

Freddie Mac has sought changes to the provisions of its Congressional charter that requires private mortgage insurance for low-down-payment mortgages and has lobbied the U.S. Congress for amendments that would permit Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to use alternative forms of default loss protection or otherwise forego the use of private mortgage insurance. In October 1998, the U.S. Congress passed legislation to amend Freddie Mac’s charter to give it flexibility to use credit enhancements other than private mortgage insurance for downpayment mortgages. Although this charter amendment was quickly repealed, we cannot predict whether similar legislation may be proposed or enacted in the future.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have the ability to implement new eligibility requirements for mortgage insurers. They also have the authority to increase or reduce required mortgage insurance coverage percentages and to alter or liberalize underwriting standards on low-down-payment mortgages they purchase. We cannot

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predict the extent to which any new requirements may be enacted or how they may affect the operations of our mortgage insurance business, our capital requirements and our products.

Changes in the policies of the Federal Home Loan Banks could reduce the demand for U.S. mortgage insurance.

The Federal Home Loan Banks, or FHLBs, purchase single-family conforming mortgage loans originated by participating member institutions. Although the FHLBs are not required to purchase insurance for mortgage loans, they currently use mortgage insurance on substantially all mortgage loans with a loan-to-value ratio above 80% and have become a source of new business for us. If the FHLBs were to reduce their purchases of mortgage loans, purchase uninsured mortgage loans or increase the loan-to-value ratio threshold above which they require mortgage insurance, the market for mortgage insurance could decrease, and our mortgage insurance business could be adversely affected.

We compete with government-owned and government-sponsored entities in our mortgage insurance business, and this may put us at a competitive disadvantage on pricing and other terms and conditions.

Our mortgage insurance business competes with many different government-owned and government sponsored entities in the U.S., Canada and some European countries. In the U.S., these entities include principally the FHA and, to a lesser degree, the VA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as local and state housing finance agencies. In Canada, we compete with the CMHC, a Crown corporation owned by the Canadian government. In Europe, these entities include public mortgage guarantee facilities in a number of countries.

Those competitors may establish pricing terms and business practices that may be influenced by motives such as advancing social housing policy or stabilizing the mortgage lending industry, which may not be consistent with maximizing return on capital or other profitability measures. In addition, those governmental entities typically do not have the same capital requirements that we and other mortgage insurance companies have and therefore may have financial flexibility in their pricing and capacity that could put us at a competitive disadvantage in some respects. In the event that a government-owned or sponsored entity in one of our markets determines to reduce prices significantly or alter the terms and conditions of its mortgage insurance or other credit enhancement products in furtherance of social or other goals rather than a profit motive, we may be unable to compete in that market effectively, which could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

We compete in Canada with the CMHC, which is owned by the Canadian government and, as a sovereign entity, provides mortgage lenders with 100% capital relief from bank regulatory requirements on loans that it insures. In contrast, lenders receive only 90% capital relief on loans we insure. CMHC also operates the Canadian Mortgage Bond Program, which provides lenders the ability to efficiently guaranty and securitize their mortgage loan portfolios. If we are unable to effectively distinguish ourselves competitively with our Canadian mortgage lender customers, we may be unable to compete effectively with the CMHC as a result of the more favorable capital relief it can provide or the other products and incentives that it offers to lenders.

Changes in regulations that affect the mortgage insurance business could affect our operations significantly and could reduce the demand for mortgage insurance.

In addition to the general regulatory risks that are described above under “—Our insurance businesses are heavily regulated, and changes in regulation may reduce our profitability and limit our growth,” we are also affected by various additional regulations relating particularly to our mortgage insurance operations.

U.S. federal and state regulations affect the scope of our competitors’ operations, which has an effect on the size of the mortgage insurance market and the intensity of the competition in our mortgage insurance business. This competition includes not only other private mortgage insurers, but also U.S. federal and state governmental

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and quasi-governmental agencies, principally the FHA, and to a lesser degree, the VA, which are governed by federal regulations. Increases in the maximum loan amount that the FHA can insure, and reductions in the mortgage insurance premiums the FHA charges, can reduce the demand for private mortgage insurance. The FHA has also streamlined its down-payment formula and made FHA insurance more competitive with private mortgage insurance in areas with higher home prices. These and other legislative and regulatory changes could cause demand for private mortgage insurance to decrease.

Our U.S. mortgage insurance business, as a credit enhancement provider in the residential mortgage lending industry, also is subject to compliance with various federal and state consumer protection and insurance laws, including the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Housing Act, the Homeowners Protection Act, the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and others. Among other things, these laws prohibit payments for referrals of settlement service business, require fairness and non-discrimination in granting or facilitating the granting of credit, require cancellation of insurance and refund of unearned premiums under certain circumstances, govern the circumstances under which companies may obtain and use consumer credit information, and define the manner in which companies may pursue collection activities. Changes in these laws or regulations could adversely affect the operations and profitability of our mortgage insurance business. For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development is considering a rule that would exempt certain mortgages that provide a single price for a package of settlement services from the prohibition in the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, or RESPA, against payments for referrals of settlement service business. If mortgage insurance were included among the settlement services that, when offered as a package, would be exempt from this prohibition, then mortgage lenders would have greater leverage in obtaining business concessions from mortgage insurers.

The Office of Thrift Supervision recently amended its capital regulations to increase from 80% to 90% the loan-to-value threshold in the definition of a “qualifying mortgage loan.” The capital regulations assign a lower risk weight to qualifying mortgage loans than to non-qualifying loans. As a result, these new regulations no longer penalize mortgage lenders for retaining loans that have loan-to-value ratios between 80% and 90% without credit enhancements. Other regulators, including the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, also have raised corresponding loan-to-value thresholds for qualifying mortgage loans from 80% to 90%.

Lenders and loan aggregators also have faced new liabilities and compliance risks posed by state and local laws which have been enacted in recent years to combat “predatory lending” practices. In February 2003 and March 2004, the Ney-Lucas Responsible Lending Act of 2003 and the Prohibit Predatory Lending Act of 2004, respectively, were introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives but were not enacted into law. These or similar bills, if reintroduced and enacted, would, among other things, prohibit certain lending practices on high cost mortgages and limit the liability of persons who comply with the law. It is unclear in what form, if any, such bills will be enacted or what impact they would have on our business and the mortgage lending, securitization, and insurance industries generally.

Regulations in Canada require the use of mortgage insurance for all mortgage loans extended by banks, trust companies and insurers with loan-to-value ratios greater than 75%. In February 2005, as part of a periodic review of the federal financial services regulatory framework, the Canadian Department of Finance issued a consultation document seeking comment on a wide variety of potential initiatives relating to the regulation of financial services, including whether to remove the statutory requirement for mortgage insurance on all loans with loan-to-value ratios greater than 75%. The removal of the statutory requirement for mortgage insurance, in whole or in part, may result in a reduction in the amount of business we write in future years in Canada.

We have an agreement with the Canadian government under which it guarantees the benefits payable under a mortgage insurance policy, less 10% of the original principal amount of an insured loan, in the event that we fail to make claim payments with respect to that loan because of insolvency. This guarantee provides that the government has the right to review the terms of the guarantee in certain circumstances, including if GE’s ownership of our Canadian mortgage insurance company decreases below 50%. When GE reduces its equity

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ownership of us to below 50%, that reduction would permit the Canadian government to review the terms of its guarantee and could lead to a termination of the guarantee for any new insurance written after the termination. Although we believe the Canadian government will preserve the guarantee to maintain competition in the Canadian mortgage insurance industry, any adverse change in the guarantee’s terms and conditions or termination of the guarantee could have an adverse effect on our ability to continue offering mortgage insurance products in Canada.

The Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, or APRA, regulates all financial institutions in Australia, including general, life and mortgage insurance companies. APRA also determines the minimum regulatory capital requirements for depository institutions. APRA’s current regulations provide for reduced capital requirements for depository institutions that insure residential mortgages with loan-to-value ratios above 80% (in the case of “standard” loans) and, from October 1, 2004, with loan-to-value ratios above 60% (in the case of “non-standard” type loans). APRA’s regulations currently require APRA-regulated lenders to determine the criteria for determining if a loan is a “non-standard” type loan. Also, APRA has proposed changes to its minimum regulatory capital requirement applicable to mortgage insurers in Australia. While they have not yet been issued in final form, based on the most recently revised proposal made available for comment and discussion with APRA personnel, we do not expect the revised minimum regulatory capital requirements to require any additional capital to be invested in our Australian mortgage insurance business, but we can not be sure this will be the case.

We believe the revisions to a set of regulatory rules and procedures governing global bank capital standards that were introduced by the Basel Committee of the Bank for International Settlements, known as Basel II, may encourage growth of international mortgage insurance. Basel II has been designed to reward banks that have developed effective risk management systems by allowing them to hold less capital than banks with less effective systems. Basel II was finalized and issued in June 2004; however, its adoption by individual countries is ongoing. Therefore, we cannot predict the benefits that ultimately will be provided to lenders, or how any such benefits may affect the opportunities for the growth of mortgage insurance. If countries implement Basel II in a manner that does not reward lenders for using mortgage insurance as a credit risk mitigant on high loan-to-value mortgage loans, or if lenders conclude that mortgage insurance does not provide sufficient capital incentives, then we may have to revise our product offerings to meet the new requirements and our results of operations may be adversely affected.

Our U.S. mortgage insurance business could be adversely affected by legal actions under RESPA.

RESPA prohibits paying lenders for the referral of settlement services, including mortgage insurance. This precludes us from providing services to mortgage lenders free of charge, charging fees for services that are lower than their reasonable or fair market value, and paying fees for services that others provide that are higher than their reasonable or fair market value. In addition, RESPA prohibits persons from giving or accepting any portion or percentage of a charge for a real estate settlement service, other than for services actually performed. A number of lawsuits, including some that were class actions, have challenged the actions of private mortgage insurers, including our company, under RESPA, alleging that the insurers have provided or received products or services at improperly set prices in return for the referral of mortgage insurance. We and several other mortgage insurers, without admitting any wrongdoing, reached a settlement in these cases, which includes an injunction that prohibited certain specified practices and details the basis on which mortgage insurers may provide or receive agency pool insurance, captive mortgage reinsurance, contract underwriting and other products and services and be deemed to be in compliance with RESPA. The injunction expired on December 31, 2003, and it is possible that plaintiffs will institute new litigation against private mortgage insurers, including us, to renew the injunction or to seek damages under RESPA. We also cannot predict whether our competitors will change their pricing structure or business practices now that the injunction has expired, which could require us to alter our pricing structure or business practices in response to their actions or suffer a competitive disadvantage, or whether any services we or they provide to mortgage lenders could be found to violate RESPA or any future injunction that might be issued. In addition, U.S. federal and state officials are authorized to enforce RESPA and

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to seek civil and criminal penalties, and we cannot predict whether these proceedings might be brought against us or other mortgage insurers. Any such proceedings could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

Our U.S. mortgage insurance business could be adversely affected by legal actions under the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Two actions have been filed against us in Illinois, each seeking certification of a nationwide class of consumers who allegedly were required to pay for our private mortgage insurance at a rate higher than our “lowest available rate,” based upon credit information we obtained. Each action alleges that the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, or the FCRA, requires notice to such borrowers and that we violated the FCRA by failing to give such notice. The plaintiffs in one action allege in the complaint that they are entitled to “actual damages” and “damages within the Court’s discretion of not more than $1,000 for each separate violation” of the FCRA. The plaintiffs in the other action allege that they are entitled to “appropriate actual, punitive and statutory damages” and “such other or further relief as the Court deems proper.” Similar cases also were filed against six other mortgage insurers. We intend to vigorously defend against the actions to which we are a party, but we cannot predict their outcome.

Potential liabilities in connection with our U.S. contract underwriting services could have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

We offer contract underwriting services to many of our mortgage lenders in the U.S., pursuant to which our employees and contractors work directly with the lender to determine whether the data relating to a borrower and a proposed loan contained in a mortgage loan application file complies with the lender’s loan underwriting guidelines or the investor’s loan purchase requirements. In connection with that service, we also compile the application data and submit it to the automated underwriting systems of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which independently analyze the data to determine if the proposed loan complies with their investor requirements.

Under the terms of our contract underwriting agreements, we agree to indemnify the lender against losses incurred in the event that we make material errors in determining whether loans processed by our contract underwriters meet specified underwriting or purchase criteria, subject to contractual limitations on liability. As a result, we assume credit and interest rate risk in connection with our contract underwriting services. Worsening economic conditions, a deterioration in the quality of our underwriting services or other factors could cause our contract underwriting liabilities to increase and have an adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations. Although we have established reserves to provide for potential claims in connection with our contract underwriting services, we have limited historical experience that we can use to establish reserves for these potential liabilities, and these reserves may not be adequate to cover liabilities that may arise.

If the European mortgage insurance market does not grow as we expect, we will not be able to execute our strategy to expand our business into this market.

We have devoted resources to marketing our mortgage insurance products in Europe, and we plan to continue these efforts. Our growth strategy depends partly upon the development of favorable legislative and regulatory policies throughout Europe that support increased homeownership and provide capital relief for institutions that insure their mortgage loan portfolios with private mortgage insurance. In furtherance of these policies, we have collaborated with government agencies to develop bank regulatory capital requirements that provide incentives to lenders to implement risk transfer strategies such as mortgage insurance, as well as governmental policies that encourage homeownership as a wealth accumulation strategy for borrowers with limited resources to make large down payments. We have invested, and we will continue to invest, significant resources to advocate such a regulatory environment at the national and pan-European levels. However, if European legislative and regulatory agencies fail to adopt these policies, then the European markets for high loan-to-value lending and mortgage insurance may not expand as we currently anticipate, and our growth strategy in those markets may not be successful.

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Risks Relating to Our Separation from GE

Our separation from GE could adversely affect our business and profitability due to GE’s strong brand and reputation.

As a subsidiary of GE, our businesses have marketed many of their products using the “GE” brand name and logo, and we believe the association with GE has provided many benefits, including:

Our separation from GE following our corporate reorganization and the IPO could adversely affect our ability to attract and retain highly qualified independent sales intermediaries and dedicated sales specialists for our products. In addition, because of our separation from GE, some of our existing policyholders, contractholders and other customers may choose to stop doing business with us, and this could increase our rate of surrenders and withdrawals in our policies and contracts. In addition, other potential policyholders and contractholders may decide not to purchase our products because of our separation from GE.

We cannot accurately predict the effect that our separation from GE will have on our sales intermediaries, customers or employees. The risks relating to our separation from GE could materialize at various times in the future, including:

We only have the right to use the GE brand name and logo for a limited period of time. If we fail to establish in a timely manner a new, independently recognized brand name with a strong reputation, our revenue and profitability could decline.

Since the completion of the IPO, our corporate name has been “Genworth Financial, Inc.” We and our insurance and other subsidiaries may use the GE brand name and logo in marketing our products and services for only a limited period of time. Pursuant to a transitional trademark license agreement, GE granted us the right to use the “GE” mark and the “GE” monogram for up to five years after the IPO in connection with our products and services. GE also granted us the right to use “GE,” “General Electric” and “GE Capital” in the corporate names of our subsidiaries until the earlier of twelve months after the date on which GE owns less than 20% of our outstanding common stock and May 24, 2009. When our right to use the GE brand name and logo expires, we may not be able to maintain or enjoy comparable name recognition or status under our new brand. In addition, insurance regulators in the U.S. and the other countries where we do business could require us to accelerate the transition to our independent brand. If we are unable to successfully manage the transition of our business to our new brand, our reputation among our independent sales intermediaries, customers and employees could be adversely affected.

Our historical and pro forma financial information is not necessarily representative of the results we would have achieved as a stand-alone company and may not be a reliable indicator of our future results.

The historical and pro forma financial information incorporated by reference in this prospectus does not reflect the financial condition, results of operations or cash flows we would have achieved as a stand-alone

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company during the periods presented or those we will achieve in the future. This is primarily a result of the following factors:

The terms of our arrangements with GE may be more favorable than we would be able to obtain from an unaffiliated third party. We may be unable to replace the services GE provides us in a timely manner or on comparable terms.

We and GE entered into a transition services agreement and other agreements in connection with the IPO. Pursuant to these arrangements, GE and its affiliates agreed to provide us with a variety of services, including investment management, treasury, payroll and other financial services, human resources and employee benefit services, legal services, information systems and network services, and procurement and sourcing support.

We negotiated these arrangements with GE in the context of a parent-subsidiary relationship. Although GE is contractually obligated to provide us with services during the terms of these arrangements, we cannot assure

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you that these services will be sustained at the same level after the expiration of those arrangements, or that we will be able to replace these services in a timely manner or on comparable terms. Other agreements with GE also govern the relationship between us and GE and provide for the allocation of employee benefit, tax and other liabilities and obligations attributable or related to periods or events prior to the IPO. They also contain terms and provisions that may be more favorable than terms and provisions we might have obtained in arm’s-length negotiations with unaffiliated third parties. When GE ceases to provide services pursuant to those arrangements, our costs of procuring those services from third parties may increase.

In addition, under the transition services agreement and other agreements, GE is obligated to provide us with certain services only so long as GE owns more than 50% of our outstanding common stock. We have been preparing for the transition of these services from GE to us or to third-party providers. However, we cannot assure you that we will be in position to complete the transition of those services by the time that GE ceases to own more than 50% of our outstanding common stock.

We have agreed to make payments to GE based on the projected amounts of certain tax savings, and these payments will remain fixed even if, because of insufficient taxable income or as a result of reduced tax rates, our actual tax savings are less than projected.

We entered into a tax matters agreement with GE in connection with the IPO. We refer to this agreement as the Tax Matters Agreement. Under the Tax Matters Agreement, we have an obligation to pay to GE a fixed amount over approximately 18 years. This fixed obligation equals 80% of the tax savings we are projected to realize (subject to a maximum amount) as a result of the tax elections made in connection with our separation from GE. The estimated present value of our fixed obligation as of the completion of the IPO was $389 million. Our obligation to GE could change, however, if the facts or assumptions on which we base our projections are not borne out, and the present value of our obligations may increase as a result. However, except for specified contingent benefits and excluding interest on payments we defer, our total payments to GE will not exceed $640 million. Although the Tax Matters Agreement generally provides for increases or reductions to our payment obligations if the current facts and assumptions underlying the projected tax savings prove inaccurate, it does not provide for reductions in our obligations if we fail to generate sufficient income to realize the projected tax savings or if our actual tax savings are reduced as a result of reduced tax rates. In these circumstances, we will remain obligated to pay to GE the fixed obligation, as initially projected or subsequently adjusted, even though it exceeds 80%, or even 100%, of the tax savings we actually realize. If the amounts we are obligated to pay to GE remain fixed while the tax savings we actually realize decline, there could be a material adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.

In the event of a change in control of our company, our obligations under the Tax Matters Agreement could accelerate, and we cannot assure you that we will have sufficient funds to meet these obligations.

In some circumstances, such as a change in control over the management and policies of our company (other than through a sale of our stock by GE), the amounts we owe under the Tax Matters Agreement could accelerate, and the amounts then due and payable could be substantial. The acceleration of payments would be subject to the approval of certain state insurance regulators, and we are obligated to use our reasonable best efforts to seek these approvals. In the event these approvals are granted and the acceleration of payments does occur, we cannot assure you that we will have sufficient funds available to meet these accelerated obligations when due. If we do not have sufficient funds available, we may seek to fund these obligations from dividends or other payments from our subsidiaries, but we cannot be certain that they will have sufficient funds available or be permitted to transfer them to us. See “—As a holding company, we depend on the ability of our subsidiaries to transfer funds to us to pay dividends and to meet our obligations.” We also may seek to fund these obligations from the proceeds of the issuance of debt or equity securities or the sale of assets, but we cannot assure you that we will be able to successfully issue any securities or consummate an asset sale.

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Under the Tax Matters Agreement, GE controls certain tax returns and audits that can result in tax liability for us.

Under the Tax Matters Agreement, GE has retained control over the preparation and filing, as well as the contests, audits and amendments or other changes of certain pre-IPO federal income tax returns with respect to which we remain liable for taxes. In addition, determinations regarding the allocation to us of responsibility to pay taxes for pre-IPO periods will be made by GE in its reasonable discretion. Although the Tax Matters Agreement provides that we are not liable for taxes resulting from returns filed or matters settled by GE without our consent if the return or settlement position is found to be unreasonable, taking into account both the liability that we incur and any non-Genworth tax benefit, it is possible that we will pay more taxes than we would have paid if we were permitted to control such matters.

GE has significant control over us and may not exercise its control in a way that benefits our public securityholders.

As of the date hereof, GEFAHI owns approximately 52% of our outstanding common stock. GE indicated in May 2005 that it expects, subject to market conditions, to reduce its ownership over the following two years as we transition to full independence. GE has also informed us that, in any event, it expects to reduce its interest in us to below 50% by value by May 27, 2006 (in satisfaction of a condition to a tax ruling secured in connection with the IPO). GE has adopted a formal Plan of Divestiture embodying this expectation to reduce its interest below 50% and has represented to the Internal Revenue Service, or IRS, that it will accomplish the divestiture. The adverse financial consequences to GE from a failure to effect the divestiture below 50% are significant. However, so long as GE continues to beneficially own more than 50% of our outstanding voting stock, GE generally will be able to determine the outcome of many corporate actions requiring stockholder approval. GE, in its capacity as the beneficial holder of all outstanding shares of our Class B Common Stock, also has the right to elect a majority of the members of our board of directors so long as it continues to beneficially own more than 50% of our outstanding common stock and will have the right to elect a decreasing percentage of the members of our board of directors as its beneficial ownership of our common stock decreases. In addition, until the first date on which GE owns less than 20% of our outstanding common stock, the prior affirmative vote or written consent of GE is required for the following actions (subject in each case to certain agreed exceptions):

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GE also can exercise control over our company pursuant to agreements that we entered into with GE in connection with the IPO and our separation from GE. See “Certain Relationships and Transactions” in our proxy statement relating to our 2005 annual meeting of stockholders. That section of our proxy statement has been incorporated by reference into our annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004, which has been incorporated by reference into this prospectus.

Because GE’s interests may differ from your interests, actions GE takes with respect to us, as our controlling stockholder, and with respect to those corporate actions requiring its prior affirmative written consent described above, may not be favorable to you.

We derive a significant portion of the premiums in our payment protection insurance business from transactions with GE.

For the years ended December 31, 2004, 2003 and 2002, GE’s consumer finance division and other related GE entities accounted for 42%, 19% and 14% of our payment protection insurance gross written premiums, respectively. In early 2004, we entered into a five-year agreement, subject to certain early termination provisions, that extends our relationship with GE’s consumer finance division and provides us with the right to be the exclusive provider of payment protection insurance in Europe for GE’s consumer finance operations in jurisdictions where we offer these products. However, if GE determines not to offer payment protection insurance, we may not be able to replace those revenues on a timely basis, and our financial condition and results of operations could suffer.

If GE engages in the same type of business we conduct, our ability to successfully operate and expand our business may be hampered.

Our certificate of incorporation provides that, subject to any contractual provision to the contrary, GE will have no obligation to refrain from:

GE is a diversified technology and services company with significant financial services businesses, including consumer finance, asset management and insurance activities. GE is engaged in the marketing of supplemental life insurance, including accidental death and dismemberment coverage and in the marketing and underwriting of dental and vision insurance, medical stop-loss insurance and primary property and casualty insurance. In addition, GE operates a significant reinsurance business, including life reinsurance, a life insurance business in the U.K. and a savings and pension business in France. Because of GE’s significant financial resources, GE could have a significant competitive advantage over us should it decide to engage in businesses that compete with any of the businesses we conduct.

GE has generally agreed not to use the “GE” mark or the “GE” monogram or the name “General Electric” until May 24, 2009 in connection with the marketing or underwriting on a primary basis of life insurance, long-term care insurance, annuities, or group life and health insurance in the U.S., or of auto insurance products in Mexico, and the underwriting or issuing of mortgage insurance products anywhere in the world. GE’s agreement to restrict the use of its brand will terminate earlier upon the occurrence of certain events, including termination of our transitional trademark license agreement with GE and our discontinuation of the use of the “GE” mark or the “GE” monogram. In addition, GE Consumer Finance, the consumer finance division of GE, has generally agreed to distribute on an exclusive basis our payment protection insurance products in certain European countries for five years, unless earlier terminated.

Conflicts of interest may arise between us and GE that could be resolved in a manner unfavorable to us.

Questions relating to conflicts of interest may arise between us and GE in a number of areas relating to our past and ongoing relationships. Five of our directors were designated to our board of directors by GE. One of

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these directors is both an officer and director of GE, and the other four of these directors are also officers of GE. These directors and a number of our officers own substantial amounts of GE stock and options to purchase GE stock, and all of them participate in GE pension plans. Ownership interests of our directors or officers in GE shares, or service as a director or officer of both our company and GE, could give rise to potential conflicts of interest when a director or officer is faced with a decision that could have different implications for the two companies. These potential conflicts could arise, for example, over matters such as the desirability of an acquisition opportunity, employee retention or recruiting, or our dividend policy.

The corporate opportunity policy set forth in our certificate of incorporation addresses potential conflicts of interest between our company, on the one hand, and GE and its officers and directors who are directors of our company, on the other hand. Although these provisions are designed to resolve conflicts between us and GE fairly, we cannot assure you that any conflicts will be so resolved.

Risks Relating to Our Common Stock

Future sales of a substantial number of shares of our common stock may depress the price of our shares.

If our stockholders sell a large number of shares of our common stock, or if we issue a large number of shares of our common stock in connection with future acquisitions, financings, or other circumstances, the market price of shares of our common stock could decline significantly. Moreover, the perception in the public market that our stockholders might sell shares of our common stock could depress the market price of those shares.

GE has indicated that it expects, subject to market conditions, to reduce its ownership in us over the next two years as we transition to full independence. As a result, GE could sell all or a substantial portion of the remaining interest in our common stock in the near future. In connection with the IPO, we granted GE demand and “piggyback” registration rights with respect to the shares of our common stock. GE may exercise its demand and piggyback registration rights, and any shares so registered will be freely tradable in the public market, except for shares acquired by any of our affiliates.

Applicable laws, provisions of our certificate of incorporation and by-laws and our Tax Matters Agreement with GE may discourage takeover attempts and business combinations that stockholders might consider in their best interests.

Applicable laws, provisions of our certificate of incorporation and by-laws and our Tax Matters Agreement may delay, deter, prevent or render more difficult a takeover attempt that our stockholders might consider in their best interests. For example, they may prevent our stockholders from receiving the benefit from any premium to the market price of our common stock offered by a bidder in a takeover context. Even in the absence of a takeover attempt, the existence of these provisions may adversely affect the prevailing market price of our common stock if they are viewed as discouraging takeover attempts in the future.

Various states and non-U.S. jurisdictions in which our insurance companies are domiciled or deemed domiciled must approve any acquisition of or change in control of those insurance companies. Under most states’ statutes, an entity is presumed to have control of an insurance company if it owns, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of the voting stock of that insurance company. These regulatory restrictions may delay, deter or prevent a potential merger or sale of our company, even if our board of directors decides that it is in the best interests of stockholders for us to merge or be sold. These restrictions also may delay sales by us or acquisitions by third parties of our subsidiaries.

Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law may affect the ability of an “interested stockholder” to engage in certain business combinations, including mergers, consolidation or acquisitions of additional shares,

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for a period of three years following the time that the stockholder becomes an “interested stockholder.” An “interested stockholder” is defined to include persons owning directly or indirectly 15% or more of the outstanding voting stock of a corporation. However, our certificate of incorporation provides that we will not be governed by Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law until GE reduces its ownership interest in us to less than 15% of our outstanding common stock.

Our certificate of incorporation and by-laws include provisions that may have anti-takeover effects and may delay, deter or prevent a takeover attempt that our stockholders might consider in their best interests. For example, our certificate of incorporation and by-laws:

Under our Tax Matters Agreement with GE, if any person or group of persons other than GE or its affiliates gains the power to direct the management and policies of our company (other than through a sale of our stock by GE), we could become obligated immediately to pay to GE the total present value of all tax benefit payments due to GE under the agreement from the time of the change in control until the end of the 25-year term of the agreement. The estimated present value of our fixed obligation as of the completion of the IPO was $389 million. Similarly, if any person or group of persons other than us or our affiliates gains effective control of one of our subsidiaries (other than through a sale of our stock by GE), we could become obligated to pay to GE the total present value of all such payments due to GE allocable to that subsidiary, unless the subsidiary assumes the obligation to pay these future amounts under the Tax Matters Agreement and certain conditions are met. The acceleration of payments would be subject to the approval of certain state insurance regulators, and we are obligated to use our reasonable best efforts to seek these approvals. This feature of the agreement could adversely affect a potential merger or sale of our company. It could also limit our flexibility to dispose of one or more of our subsidiaries, with adverse implications for any business strategy dependent on such dispositions.

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